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The Impeachment Exception to the
Exclusionary Rules
Recently, there has been a pronounced expansion of the underlying
rationale and the coverage of the rules excluding from criminal trials
highly probative evidence obtained in violation of the accused's con-
stitutional rights.1 For example, in Miranda v. Arizona2 and Escobedo
v. Illinois3 the Court held that pretrial statements, even if voluntary,
4
are inadmissible unless the defendant was properly warned of his
rights to remain silent and to have the aid of counsel. 5 Modifying
this trend, however, is a line of cases generated by the Supreme Court's
1954 decision in Walder v. United States,6 which limits the operation of
the exclusionary rules to the prosecution's effort to establish guilt.y
1 The first of these rules appeared in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (evidence
obtained from an unlawful search and seizure by federal officials is inadmissible in a fed-
eral court). The scope of this rule has itself been greatly expanded. In 1948 the Weeks rule
was held not to apply to the states. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). It was seen prin-
cipally as a judicially created rule of evidence designed to deter unlawful police action. Id.
at 39 (Black, J., concurring). Today as a result of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the
same rule does apply to the states and is "no mere rule of evidence, but part and parcel of
the Constitution." Traynor, Mapp. v. Ohio At Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DuKE L.J. 319,
339. See also Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 24-26.
But see Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). It is no longer designed solely to deter
unlawful police action, but now protects the very integrity of our judicial system. Mr.
Justice Clark observed in Mapp: "The criminal goes free if he must, but it is the law
which sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to
observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." 367 U.S.
at 659.
2 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
4 Prior to Miranda and Escobedo, the Court used a voluntariness test. Brain v. United
States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897). Bram was applied to the states in Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278 (1935); cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952). But see Irvine v. California,
347 U.S. 128 (1954).
5 The Court said in Miranda: "Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that
he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence
against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or ap-
pointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
6 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
7 See, e.g., United States v. Curry, 358 F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Grosso,
358 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1966); Tate v. United States, 283 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1960); State v.
McClung, 66 Wash. 2d 654, 404 P.2d 460 (1965); cf. State v. Odom, 353 S.W.2d 708 (Mo.
1962). Contra, State v. Brewton, 422 P.2d 581 (Ore. 1967).
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Thus, unlawfully obtained evidence can still be used for the limited
purpose of impeaching a defendant's testimony given on direct examina-
tion.8
In Walder, a previous narcotics indictment had been dismissed after
the defendant had secured suppression of a heroin capsule obtained
through an unlawful search and seizure. During his trial on a second
narcotics offense committed two years later, the defendant voluntarily
took the stand and made a sweeping denial that he had ever had nar-
cotics in his possession. The prosecution was then permitted to intro-
duce the evidence obtained from the earlier search and seizure solely to
impeach the defendant's credibility, the jury being so instructed. Since
1954 the state and lower federal courts have extended this impeachment
exception in two principal ways: the impeaching evidence may now be
directly related to the offense being tried;9 the evidence may be a pre-
trial statement obtained from the defendant in violation of either the
fifth or sixth amendment, in addition to a physical object obtained in
violation of the fourth amendment as in Walder.10
This comment focuses on the first of these extensions, since situations
in which the evidence is directly related to the crime charged will un-
doubtedly occur much more often than the unique one in Walder where
two prosecutions were involved." Nevertheless, some discussion of the
8 The rule established in Walder was contrasted with the Court's earlier decision in
Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925), which struck down an attempt to use illegal
evidence to impeach a statement elicited from the defendant on cross-examination. Walder
v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 66 (1954).
9 See, e.g., United States v. Curry, 358 F.2d 904, 909-12 (2d Cir. 1966) (defendant's prior
statement used to impeach his testimony that he had not worn a false moustache on the
day of alleged theft); United States v. Grosso, 358 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1966) (two "black books"
containing evidence of a numbers lottery obtained during an unlawful search and seizure
used to impeach the testimony of a defendant convicted of a violation of the Gambling Tax
Act that he had not been connected with such a lottery); Tate v. United States, 283 F.2d
377, 378-80 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (defendant's prior statement that he had come to the scene of
the alleged theft with an alleged accomplice used to impeach his testimony that he had
come alone and did not know the other person); State v. McClung, 66 Wash. 2d 654, 662-
63, 404 P.2d 460, 464 (1965) (defendant's prior statement that he had placed narcotics in the
trunk of a car and knew who had committed the robbery used to impeach his testimony
that he knew nothing of the robbery, the drugs, or how they happened to be in the car);
cf. State v. Odom, 353 S.W.2d 708, 710-11 (Mo. 1962) (results of unlawful stomach pump-
ing admitted after the defendant had testified as to the occurrence of the pumping but had
not mentioned the results). These cases made another extension of Walder in that they did
not require that the defendant's denial be sweeping in nature but rather allowed him
to be impeached when his entire testimony was at least circumstantially related to the
crime charged. Contra, State v. Brewton, 422 P.2d 581 (Ore. 1967) (no portion of the
defendant's pretrial confession allowed to be used for impeachment purposes by the
prosecution).
10 See cases cited note 9 supra.
11 See, e.g., United States v. Curry, 358 F.2d 904 (2d. Cir. 1966). The Second Circuit
should never have reached the impeachment question because it overruled the trial judge's
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doctrine as applied in Walder is necessary to cover all the situations in
which unlawfully obtained evidence might be used for impeachment
purposes. Finally, in relation to the second extension, there is reason
to believe, as the Oregon Supreme Court has already held,12 that the
Supreme Court's decisions in Miranda and Escobedo have already
overruled use of illegally obtained pretrial statements for impeachment
purposes.
The extension to the Walder exception, which permits unlawfully
obtained evidence directly related to the offense charged to be used for
impeachment purposes, is dubious on three grounds: (1) it violates the
requirements of Walder itself; (2) it could gradually defeat the major
policy of deterring unlawful police action; and (3) it may tend to dis-
courage defendants from testifying. 13
The Supreme Court's holding in Walder seemed to be strongly in-
fluenced by the fact that the impeaching evidence did not bear directly
on the charge in the second trial, and thus could not have influenced the
jury on the question of guilt. 14 Though in the opinion this considera-
tion is not phrased explicitly in terms of prejudice on the question of
determination that the defendant's pretrial statement was obtained in violation of his con-
stitutional rights and thus, in effect, said the evidence was admissible directly. However,
the major part of the decision treated the evidence as if it were obtained unlawfully. See
also United States v. Grosso, 358 F.2d 154 (3d. Cir. 1966); Tate v. United States, 283 F.2d
377 (D.C. Cir. 1960). The statement admitted to impeach the defendant in Tate had not
been excluded from the prosecution's case in chief on a constitutional basis but rather
because it violated the McNabb-Mallory rule against unlawful delays prior to arraignment.
Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
However, later decisions of the District of Columbia Circuit have not taken up this distinc-
tion. Inge v. United States, 356 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1966); White v. United States, 349 F.2d
965 (D.C. Cir 1965); Johnson v. United States, 344 F.2d 163 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Brown v. United
States, 338 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1964). In any case, the Tate decision will be discussed as
if it involved the violation of a constitutional right, as it appears safe to assume that
cases involving violations of the McNabb-Mallory rule will also involve these rights.
See also State v. McClung, 66 Wash. 2d 654, 404 P.2d 460 (1965); cf. State v. Odom, 353
S.W.2d 708 (Mo. 1962). Contra, State v. Brewton, 422 P.2d 581 (Ore. 1967).
12 State v. Brewton, 422 P.2d 581 (Ore. 1967).
13 Several lower court cases seem already to have indicated the demise of the extensions
to the Walder rule. See, e.g., State v. Brewton, 422 P.2d 581 (Ore. 1967); Inge v. United
States, 356 F.2d 345 (D.C Cir. 1966); White v. United States, 349 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Johnson v. United States, 344 F.2d 163 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Brown v. United States, 338 F.2d
543 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
14 It is generally conceded, even by those favoring the exception, that prejudice would
result to the defendant on the question of guilt despite the limiting instruction when the
evidence is related to the crime charged. See, e.g., 42 GEo. L.J. 563, 565 (1954). The
belief that the jury is probably unable to limit its use of highly prejudicial evidence
appears throughout the law of evidence. See, e.g., Mr. Justice Cardozo's opinion in Shephard
v. United States, 290 U.S. 96 (1933).
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guilt, it apparently is the basis for the Court's statement that the de-
fendant "must be free to deny all the elements of the case against him
without thereby giving leave to the Government to introduce by way of
rebuttal, evidence illegally secured by it, and thereby not available for
its case in chief."' 5 Most courts that have extended the Walder doctrine
correctly recognized this phrase as an obstacle to their decisions. In
order to hurdle that barrier, they have characterized the admitted evi-
dence as relating to "collateral matters,"' 6 "peripheral non-inculpatory
matter,'u 7 or "lawful proper acts' u s not involving actual elements of the
crime charged. The interpretation these cases impose on the phrase
"elements of his crime" appears, however, to be much narrower than
that suggested by the Court in Walder. The rationale for the establish-
ment of this requirement-avoidance of prejudice to the defendant on
the question of guilt-clearly is defeated when the unlawfully obtained
evidence is as relevant to the charge being tried as that sought to be
admitted, for example, in Tate v. United States.' There, the defen-
dant's case was almost certainly prejudiced by the introduction of his
previous statement that he had come to the scene of the crime with the
man the police caught stealing a typwriter, even though the jury had
been instructed to use this evidence for impeachment purposes only.20
The Oregon Supreme Court recently stated that it was unable to
follow the Tate holding that a defendant could be impeached when he
testified on collateral matters as distinguished from simply denying his
part in the crime. 2' It called such a distinction "virtually unworkable,"
15 Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954). The importance of this consideration
was explicitly recognized in Johnson v. United States, 344 F.2d 163 (D.C. Cir. 1964),
where the Court refused to admit a complete confession: "[E]vidence used purportedly to
impeach [Johnson] . . . was a confession of the very charge on trial, raising a clear likeli-
hood of prejudice not present when, as in Walder, the impeaching evidence is unrelated
to the indictment. Thus, the Walder exception does not allow the testimony regarding
Johnson's confession .... To permit the Government to introduce illegally obtained state-
ments which bear directly on a defendant's guilt or innocence in the name of 'impeach-
ment' would seriously jeopardize the important substantive policies and functions under-
lying the established exclusionary rules." Id. at 166. Accord, Brown v. United States 338
F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
16 See, e.g., United States v. Curry, 358 F.2d 904, 911 (2d Cir. 1966); Tate v. United States,
283 F.2d 377, 381 (D.C. Cir. 1960). But see State v. Brewton, 422 P.2d 581, 583 (Ore. 1967).
See text accompanying note 23 infra.
17 Tate v. United States, 283 F.2d 377, 382 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
18 Id. at 380. In United States v. Grosso, 358 F.2d 154, 162-63 (3d Cir. 1966), and State
v. McClung, 66 Wash. 2d 654, 662, 404 P.2d 460, 464 (1965), no such characterization was
made. By implication, therefore, these courts extended the Walder doctrine to evidence that
may have been related to elements of the crime charged. See fact situations note 9 supra.
19 283 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1960). See note 9 supra.
20 See Note, Impeaching Evidence Not Inadmissible Under McNabb-Mallory Rule, 45
MINN. L. REv. 669, 673-74 (1961).
21 State v. Brewton, 442 P.2d 581, 583 (Ore. 1967).
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because a defendant taking the stand to tell his version of a crime
would almost inevitably testify as to what might be called "collateral
matters. '22 Even the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia has
limited its position in Tate by including elements of the defense in its
interpretation of the phrase "elements of his crime.12 3
Besides violating the requirements of Walder, this extension to the
impeachment exception undermines the policy of deterring unlawful
police action.24 Although the prosecution could not use unlawfully ob-
tained evidence in its case in chief, such evidence would still be useful
to it. By holding the evidence in reserve, it could place the defendant in
a position where he could: (1) take the stand and tell the "whole story"
knowing full well that the unlawfully obtained evidence would then be
admitted; (2) just deny the crime without going into detail; or (3) not
22 Ibid.
23 Inge v. United States, 356 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Although the court remanded on
the issue of whether or not Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure had been
violated, it did state that if the rule had been violated, the statements would not have been
admissible under the Walder exception, since, even though they were not confessions of
guilt as in Johnson, they were still inculpatory. See text accompanying note 14 supra. The
statements used to impeach the defendant's three claims of self-defense were: (1) that the
deceased had attacked him with a knife (his earlier statement was that the deceased did not
have a knife); (2) that he did not remember cutting the deceased, and that if he did, he
did so in the heat of passion (his prior statement was that he did remember cutting him);
and (3) that he was injured during the fight (his prior statement had made no mention of
this). Id. at 349-50.
In White v. United States, 349 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1965), the same court held as one of
three grounds for reversal that the defendant's pretrial statement had been unlawfully ad-
mitted to impeach him. At his trial the defendant testified that the deceased had come at
him with his hand in his pocket. His prior statement did not mention this fact. What dis-
tinguished this case from Tate, according to the court, was that here the impeaching evi-
dence was crucial to the defendant's main defense of self-defense. It explained that the
defendant made no "sweeping claims" as in Walder, "nor was the use of the statement
restricted to lawful acts" which are purely "collateral matters" to the issue at bar, as in
Tate; but "rather the use of the statement here bore on the central issue of the case."
Id. at 968.
In light of these cases it would appear that if Tate came before the District of Columbia
Circuit again, the result would be different; the defendant's testimony was just as central
to his defense as were the statements in Inge and White. (The defense in Tate consisted
mainly of defendant's own testimony that he had come to the scene of the crime alone, that
the stolen article was thrust into his arms, and that he was running-not to get away-
but to catch up to the person who had given him the article in order to return it. This
testimony was impeached by his earlier statement that he knew the person he was chasing
and indeed had come to the scene of the crime with him.) Tate v. United States, 283 F.2d
377, 378 (D.C. Cir. 1960). See also Johnson v. United States, 344 F.2d 163 (D.C. Cir. 1964);
Brown v. United States, 338 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
24 The importance of the deterrence argument has been repeatedly emphasized in the
courts. See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960); People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.
2d 434, 446-50, 282 P.2d 905, 913-14 (1955). For the most quoted example of the other side
of the argument, see People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 19-25; 150 N.E.2d 585, 587-89 (1927)
(Cardozo, J.).
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take the stand at all. Since the impact on the jury of a weak denial or
refusal to testify could be just as harmful to the defendant as the
admission of the evidence, deterrence of unlawful police activity by the
exclusionary rules is seriously weakened.25
Finally, as the Oregon Court recently stated: "[A]s commendable as
it may be to prevent perjury, the price of such prevention could be to
keep defendants off the stand entirely." 26 This in turn could keep much
important non-perjurious testimony from reaching the jury. Even
though a defendant had such information, he probably still would
choose not to present it out of fear that his testimony would allow the
excluded evidence to then be admitted. Thus, the defendant's testimony
would be lost to the jury even as to those matters about which he would
tell the truth.
II
The use for impeachment of unlawfully obtained evidence not
directly related to the offense being tried presents a much closer ques-
tion. Nevertheless, the balance does seem to favor rejecting the excep-
tion even in this limited situation.
The major justification for maintaining the exception is to insure
that perjury and mistaken testimony is impeached.27 Yet, the only
measurable loss to the judicial system in banning the evidence al-
together would occur where a guilty person was acquitted on the basis
of his testimony. This occurrence would appear unlikely for two reasons.
First, in many instances the police will have accumulated sufficient
evidence to obtain a conviction notwithstanding the perjury. Second,
there is no certainty that the perjured testimony would be accepted by a
jury. The defendant in a criminal case is automatically "impeached" by
the fact that he is an interested party; thus, the jury will usually be
skeptical of his assertions, especially the more sweeping ones.
A second consideration urged in support of Walder-the one on
which the Supreme Court seemed to place principal reliance2 -is that
25 45 MINN. L. REv. 669, 677-78 (1961). The deterrence argument was greatly emphasized
in the Oregon Supreme Court's recent decision not to extend Walder in State v. Brewton,
422 P.2d 581, 582 (Ore. 1967).
26 State v. Brewton, 422 P.2d 581, 583 (Ore. 1967). Contra, Tate v. United States, 283 F.2d
377, 381 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
27 This policy is not mentioned explicitly in WaIder but is in Tate v. United States, 283
F.2d 377, 379. (D.C. Cir. 1960).
28 The Court said: "It is one thing to say that the Government cannot make an affirma-
tive use of evidence unlawfully obtained. It is quite another to say that the defendant can
turn the illegal method by which evidence in the Government's possession was obtained
to his own advantage, and provide himself with a shield against contradiction of his un-
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by deliberately taking advantage of the prosecution's inability to use
the unlawfully obtained evidence in order to make a denial both per-
jurious and unnecessarily broad, the defendant waives any right he has
to object to the admission of this evidence. The Court in Walder drew
support for this argument from its earlier decision in Michelson v.
United States,29 where it had held that by presenting evidence of his
good character, the defendant opened up the subject for the prosecu-
tion, who could then use any evidence it had to show his bad character.30
On the surface, the Walder and Michelson situations are analogous.
In both, the interest to be served by admitting the prosecution's evi-
dence is increased after the defendant has testified because continued
exclusion would allow his testimony to go to the jury unchallenged; in
both, the defendant appears undeserving of the court's protection after
he has deliberately tried to turn the exclusionary rule to his own ad-
vantage. But in Michelson the original exclusion was based on a simple
evidentiary rule designed to keep out evidence thought to be more
prejudicial than probative.31 In Walder, on the other hand, constitu-
tional rights were involved, presenting issues independent of the proba-
tive value of the evidence and the defendant's reprehensible behavior.
Thus, accepting the Michelson parallel is mere question-begging because
it avoids consideration of the policies that originally lay behind the
exclusionary rules; no decision should be reached until these policies
are considered.
Two major policies would be served by abandoning the Walder
exception. The initial, and possibly still most important, is that of
deterring illegal police behavior by excluding all evidence unlawfully
obtained.32 Admittedly, the incentive to acquire evidence unlawfully
truths. Such an extension of the Weeks doctrine would be a perversion of the Fourth
Amendment.
"Take the present situation. Of his own accord, the defendant went beyond a mere denial
of complicity in the crimes of which he was charged and made the sweeping claim that he
had never dealt in or possessed any narcotics. Of course, the Constitution guarantees a
defendant the fullest opportunity to meet the accusation against him. . . . Beyond that,
however, there is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to per-
jurious testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility."
Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954).
29 335 U.S. 469 (1948), cited in Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 n.34 (1954).
30 ~fichelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 479 (1948). See McCoaarIcK, EVIDENCE 337
(1954).
31 335 U.S. at 479.
32 See notes 24-25 supra and accompanying text. The deterrence argument established in
the search and seizure cases is also applicable to the rules of Miranda and Escobedo (see
note 4 supra and accompanying text), and to Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)
(evidence obtained from a stomach pumping without consent held to so "shock the con-
science" as to be a violation of the due process clause and thus be inadmissible in court).
Cf. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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would not be very great if it were admissible only in a case as unusual
as Walder. Nevertheless, it could be argued that a complete prohibition
against use of unlawfully obtained evidence is needed to remove all
incentive for illegal police behavior.8 3 The announcement of an abso-
lute rule may have psychological impact on the police, if nothing else.
The second consideration behind the exclusionary rules has been
characterized by the Supreme Court as "the imperative of judicial in-
tegrity."34 As one commentator recently stated,
[I]n a constitutional democracy of limited powers, a govern-
ment agency has no authority over an individual except that
which is conferred upon it by law; if such authority is ex-
ceeded, the fruits of such excess should not be recognized by
any branch of government, especially that branch which has
the foremost role in furthering the rule of law. The law sets
limits to the state's exercise of power over the individual, and,
regardless of mitigating circumstances, a substantial over-
stepping of those limits should not be legally cognizable. A
court sworn to uphold and promote observance of the law
cannot adequately perform its function if it ignores illegality
in the enforcement of the law. 35
The admission of illegally obtained evidence, even if limited to the
WaIder situation, would fly in the face of this policy; it would neces-
sarily involve judicial sanctioning of unlawful police behavior.3 6
In reply, one could argue that by excluding the tainted evidence, the
judges are thereby sanctioning perjury. However, Mr. Justice Brandeis
has pointed out that "Our government is the potent omnipresent
33 See, e.g., Note, Standing to Object to an Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 34 U. CI.
L. REv. 342 (1967).
34 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960). This policy is generally said to have
originated in the dissents of Justices Holmes and Brandeis in Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438 (1928).
35 Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability and Due Process, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 719, 751-52
(1966). See also People v. Reilly, 105 N.Y.S.2d 845 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1951) (Oliver, J., concur-
ring).
36 See 45 MINN. L. RFv. 669, 679 (1961). An additional policy behind the exclusionary
rules has been characterized as a "privilege against conviction by unlawfully obtained evi-
dence." Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 35. The ra-
tionale behind it has been expressed as follows: "[flust as we cannot tolerate the continued
imprisonment of a man whose conviction was based on unreliable evidence, so we cannot
tolerate the continued imprisonment of a man whose conviction failed in other respects
to meet the fundamental legal standards of the community." Schwartz, note 35 supra, at
749. To advance this policy as a basis for overruling Walder would be anomalous, however,
because a defendant who has deliberately committed perjury seems hardly worthy of being
afforded this privilege. Rather, arguments for overturning Walder should focus on policies
that are independent of the behavior of the defendant.
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teacher .... If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds con-
tempt for the law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself." 87
Thus, given the choice of whether it could do greater harm to "sanction"
the individual or the governmental wrong, the answer is clearly the
latter.
In balancing the desirability of insuring that perjury does not go
unimpeached against maintaining absolute deterrence and govern-
mental integrity, no clear cut conclusion appears. The gains on both
sides are tenuous. Nevertheless, in light of what has been said about the
slight effect impeachment of the defendant's testimony would have in
most cases,38 deterrence and integrity appear to provide the more certain
gain, and perhaps the more important as well. Furthermore, to keep the
exception for just the limited situations where two prosecutions were
involved and the defendant made an unnecessarily broad denial would
burden the judicial system with the cost of administering a minor dis-
tinction in an area of law presently overburdened with such techni-
calities.
III
The second principal extension of the Walder exception has been its
application to a defendant's pretrial statements. This would appear to
be a natural extension in situations where the trial court is confident
that the statements are as reliable as physical evidence normally is;39
the two types of evidence would then be equally capable of impeaching
the defendant's testimony.40 The Supreme Court's recent decisions in
Miranda v. Arizona4l and Escobedo v. Illinois42 seem to indicate, how-
ever, that this extension is no longer tenable. Before a suspect can make
a statement admissible directly at his trial, he must have been effectively
apprised of his rights to remain silent and to have the aid of counsel.43
It is contended here that, as the Oregon Supreme Court recently held,44
37 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
38 See text following note 27 supra.
39 United States v. Curry, 358 F.2d 904, 911 (2d Cir. 1966) stating that Tate v. United
States, 283 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1960) extended the Walder doctrine to statements.
40 The distinction between physical evidence and statements is noted in 4 Hous.
L. RFv. 144 (1966), criticizing Curry v. United States, 858 F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1966), and Note,
supra note 20, 45 MINN L. REv. at 674-76 (1961), criticizing Tate v. United States, 283 F.2d
377 (D.C. Cir. 1960). A further distinction between the two is that while physical evidence
could be absolute proof that perjury had been committed, a previous statement could only
show that the defendant had contradicted himself.
41 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See note 5 supra.
42 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
43 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). See note 5, supra.
44 State v. Brewton, 422 P.2d 581 (Ore. 1967). See text accompanying notes 21-22 supra.
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the defendant's pretrial statements made in violation of this procedure
have now been made unavailable to the prosecution for any purpose.
There are two possible ways to avoid this conclusion. First, it could
be argued that Miranda and Escobedo were not based on a reliability
rationale and hence were not meant to affect the impeachment rule as
previously applied. Support for this argument can be found in Johnson
v. New Jersey,45 where the Court stated that Miranda and Escobedo
added little to the reliability of the guilt determining process.
To maintain this position is, however, to disregard what appears to be
the best interpretation of the two decisions-that they are the Court's
final effort to end judicial frustration caused by the clash between the
inability to know what goes on at the police precinct and the desire to
check "the danger [of secret interrogation] at the outset." 46 The method
chosen was to try to avoid the questions of voluntariness and reliability
by prescribing conditions for lawful police interrogation. Continued
application of the Walder rule to pretrial statements will make it neces-
sary for the courts to determine the reliability question in all cases
where the prosecution takes advantage of the impeachment exception,
thereby immersing the courts in the very task that Miranda and
Escobedo were designed to obviate.
Furthermore, as one commentator has noted,47 the importance of the
reliability rationale in these two cases should not be underestimated.
The Court explicitly stated in Escobedo: "We have learned the lesson
of history, ancient and modern, that a system of criminal law enforce-
ment which comes to depend on the 'confession' will, in the long run be
less reliable, and most subject to abuses . *... "48 Moreover, it must be
remembered that the Johnson decision was concerned with the question
of whether Miranda and Escobedo should be applied retroactively.
Prior to Johnson, the Court had determined that the retroactivity ques-
tion would turn principally on whether or not the newly established
rule affected the reliability of the guilt-determining process.49 Thus,
45 384 U.S. 719, 730 (1966).
46 Kamisar, A Dissent From the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fifth
Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH. L. REv. 59, 92 (1966).
47 "But even if the doctrine is no longer primarily based on a fear of untrustworthy
confessions, the constitutional rules may still have an intended effect upon the reliability
of the guilt-determining process. For as the Court pointed out in the opinion that most
explicitly indicated that the exclusionary rule does not depend upon a specific determina-
tion of unreliability, 'confessions cruelly extorted may be and have been, to an unascer-
tained extent, found to be untrustworthy."' Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, the
Great Writ and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARv. L. REv. 56, 84 (1965), quoting
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961).
48 378 U.S. at 488-89 (emphasis added).
49 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639 (1965). Accord, Tehen v. United States ex rel.
Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1965). See generally Mishkin, supra note 47.
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in Johnson the Court had to deemphasize the importance of the re-
liability rationale of Miranda in order to reach the negative result it
seemed to desire for other reasons. 50 Once taken out of this context, the
reliability rationale seems to have sufficient vitality to warrant the much
less serious step of dispensing with the Walder exception in regard to
pretrial statements.
The conclusion that Miranda and Escobedo have implicitly overruled
Walder with regard to pretrial statements can also be avoided by urging
that these cases were meant to apply only to a confession of guilt and
hence not to affect statements made on issues "collateral" to this ques-
tion.51 This position, however, ignores the implication if not the ex-
plicit language of Miranda. There the Court said that the exclusion of
pre-trial statements covered so-called exculpatory as well as inculpatory
statements; 52 the same conclusion would seem to follow as to statements
on collateral issues. For the court reasoned that:
[S]tatements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defen-
dant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial or to
demonstrate untruths in the statement given under interroga-
tion and thus to prove guilt by implication. These statements
are incriminating in any meaningful sense of the word and
may not be used without the full warnings and effective waiver
required for any other statement.5 3
50 Throughout all the retroactivity decisions, the Court seems to be concerned with a
much more practical problem than whether or not the guilt-determining process is under-
mined. For example, in Johnson it said; "[R]etroactive application of Escobedo and Miranda
would seriously disrupt the administration of our criminal laws." Johnson v. New Jersey,
384 U.S. 719, 731 (1966). Perhaps the clearest expression of this concern is found in Link-
letter, where the Court cautioned: "Finally, there are interests in the administration of
justice and the integrity of the judicial process to consider. To make the rule of Mapp
retrospective would tax the administration of justice to the utmost. Hearings would have
to be held on the excludability of evidence long since destroyed, misplaced or deteriorated.
If it is excluded, the witnesses available at the time of the original trial will not be avail-
able or if located their memory will be dimmed. To thus legitimate such an extraordinary
procedural weapon that has no bearing on guilt would seriously disrupt the administration
of justice." Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637-38 (1965). See also Tehan v. United States
ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 418 (1966). That this is a key rationale behind the decisions is
implied by several commentators. See, e.g., Note, Past Convictions Obtained Through Un-
reasonable Search and Seizure, 25 GA. B.J. 238, 239 (1962). This factor is also prominent in
the arguments of those authors favoring nonretroactivity. See, e.g., Bender, The Retroactive
Effect of an Overruling Constitutional Decision: Mapp v. Ohio, 110 U. PA. L. Rav. 650, 659
(1962); Traynor, supra note 1, at 341-42. For a full scale attack on the retroactivity decisions
as a whole and on the Mishkin article, supra note 47, in particular, see Schwartz, supra
note 35.
51 The distinction between collateral as opposed to directly relevant evidence was made
in United States v. Curry, 358 F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1966); see text accompanying notes 16-18
supra.
52 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476-77 (1966).
53 Id. at 477.
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CONCLUSION
The impeachment exception as defined in Walder represents a defi-
nite chink in the armor of the exclusionary rules. While it may justi-
fiably be used to bring in physical evidence not directly related to the
crime charged, Miranda and Escobedo indicate that any use of illegally
obtained pre-trial statements will be prohibited. In any event, evidence
directly related to the crime charged should not be permitted before the
jury under the thin veil of impeachment. The possibility of improper
prejudice to the merits of defendant's case, the deterrent effect on his
willingness to testify, and the incentive provided to the police to act
unlawfully are losses to the judicial system which greatly outweigh the
possible gains from the unmasking of perjury.
